A healthy banking system is a fundamental condition for financial stability. When assessing the riskiness of the banking system, analysts often restrict their focus to large banks. This may create a distorted picture in countries like Germany with fragmented banking systems. In Germany, savings banks and cooperative banks taken together are important players in the market. However, little is known about their default risk. The reason is that these banks usually resolve financial distress within their own organisations, which means defaults are not observable from the outside. In this paper we use a new dataset which contains information about financial distress and financial strength of all German savings banks and cooperative banks. The data have been gathered by the Deutsche Bundesbank for microprudential supervision and have never before been exploited for macroprudential purposes. We use the data to identify the main risk drivers. To this end we estimate a default prediction model (hazard model). A second goal of the paper is to analyse the impact of macroeconomic information for forecasting banks' defaults. Recent findings for the USA have cast some doubt on the usefulness of macroeconomic information for banks' risk assessment. Contrary to recent literature, we find that macroeconomic information significantly improves default forecasts.
Non-technical summary
There is little evidence on the default risk of German savings banks and cooperative banks, although they constitute an integral part of the German banking system. Our aim is to develop a statistical system which estimates probabilities of default (PDs) for savings banks and cooperative banks. We also try to find evidence for the importance of macroeconomic developments for the estimation of PD. Since we adopt a prudential supervisory perspective, default is defined as any event that jeopardises the bank's viability as a going concern.
The paper uses a dataset from the Deutsche Bundesbank that combines default events with balance sheet information, audit reports, and macroeconomic variables. The data is used to estimate a discrete hazard model. Hazard models are particularly suited for our purposes because they simultaneously include macroeconomic and microeconomic data.
Our main findings are as follows.
1 The relevant factors for the PD estimation are capitalisation, return, credit risk, market risk and the macroeconomic context.
2 Savings banks and cooperative banks can be assessed with the same model. Savings banks, however, reveal a slightly higher risk sensitivity.
3 Models which rely solely on bank-specific information provide good predictors for the relative risk of a bank, yet they are not able to capture the risk level. The performance of the risk level forecast greatly improves if macroeconomic variables are added to the model.
Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung
Sparkassen und Kreditgenossenschaften spielen eine bedeutende Rolle im deutschen 
Introduction
Banks' defaults have to be taken particularly seriously since they are associated with a potential destabilisation of the financial system through contagion. A healthy banking system is therefore a pivotal point for financial stability. When measuring the default risk of banks, analysts typically focus on big banks. Rating agencies provide ratings for about 40 German banks, mostly private banks and Landesbanken.
1 The Credit Monitor of Moody's KMV includes only publicly listed banks, which in Germany amount to 21 institutions. There is, however, almost no empirical evidence for the default risk of cooperative banks or savings banks 2 . These banking groups are important players in the German market, since they represent roughly 25% of the total assets of all German banks and grant about 35% of all loans to German non-banks 3 . Furthermore, they differ considerably from the banks that rating agencies focus on regarding their ownership structure and business focus (see Schmidt and Tyrell (2004) for an overview of the German financial sector). Obviously, neglecting the default risk of these banking groups can cause a severe bias in the total risk assessment of the banking sector.
From a microeconomic perspective, also, it is desirable to learn more about the risk and the The fact that there is so little knowledge about the default risk of savings and cooperative banks may be astonishing at first sight, but it can be explained quite simply by a lack of data due to a German particularity: German savings and cooperative banks usually resolve financial distress within their own organisations. Therefore, public default data for these banking groups is not available. In this paper we are able to present some empirical evidence thanks to the unpublished dataset at our disposal. The dataset covers default data, balance sheet information and supervisory reports for all German banks from 1993 to 2002. It has been gathered by the Deutsche Bundesbank and has never before been exploited for macroprudential risk assessment. We use the data to estimate the individual PDs for savings banks and cooperative banks. This is done with the help of a default prediction model that allows us to identify the main risk drivers. We also use the model to analyse possible structural differences in the default risk between savings banks and cooperative banks.
We further contribute to the literature by assessing how much of the model outcome can be attributed to internal (bank-specific) factors and how much to external factors (macroeconomic developments). This issue is of growing importance since deregulation and increased competition seem to have tightened the link between the riskiness of savings and cooperative banks and macroeconomic developments. In fact, the recent economic downturn, with numerous insolvencies and the collapse of the stock market, has probably had a greater impact on their resilience than ever before in the post-war period: see, eg, IMF (2003).
Contrary to this intuition, Nuxoll (2003) finds that macroeconomic information does not improve the forecasts of bank defaults. However, his work is limited to US banks and there is no empirical work for Germany. Since we expect different results for Germany, we use our dataset to analyse the question.
We approach the questions raised in this section with a hazard model. In the past few years, hazard models have become widely used in the literature mainly due to their ability to estimate PDs for different forecast horizons (see the literature overview in section 2). Instead, we avail ourselves of a different characteristic: that hazard models estimate the influence of individual (bank-specific) information and time series (macroeconomic) information -3 -simultaneously.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the following section we will briefly review the relevant literature (section 2). Section 3 states the goals more precisely and describes the data. In section 4 we turn to a discussion of the methods and then provide an overview of the methods used for the model specification (section 5). Section 6 and 7 present and evaluate the results of the models. Section 8 concludes.
-4 -Starting from seminal work of Altman (1968) and Beaver (1968) , today we can look back at more than three decades of experience in using statistical models to predict defaults. Soon after their introduction these methods were applied to banks, examples being Sinkey (1975) , Martin (1977) and Altman (1977) . At the beginning, discriminant analysis was the leading method. The drawback to this method is the assumption of normally distributed regressors. As generally financial ratios are not normally distributed, maximum-likelihood methods have been used more frequently since the 1980s (Martin (1977) ; see also the overview of the literature in Demirgüc-Kunt (1989) and Lennox (1999) ). Logit and probit procedures are advantageous not only for statistical reasons but also because they directly estimate PDs.
4
Logit and probit models and discriminant analyses are all cross-sectional methods. Since the data on bank defaults are typically gathered at different points in time -as is the case heremore recent studies such as Cole, Gunther (1995) , Shumway (2001) , Estrella et al (2000) , Henebry (1996) or Looney et al (1989) , favour the use of hazard models. Many authors use the Cox proportional hazard model, which exploits the fact that the default data are available on a daily basis; see, for example, Lane et al (1986) , Henebry (1996) or Molina (2002) . The advantage of the Cox model is that one can analyse the development of PDs over time. This may be useful for special questions such as those addressed in the paper of Claeys et al (2004) , where the timing of the closure of a bank after insolvency is investigated for Russian banks. Instead, we argue that time-discrete hazard models are more adequate for our purposes.
The main reason is that bank defaults, although available with daily frequency, can only be interpreted on an annual basis. The following section shows that the supervisory (or internal) act which constitutes the default typically is the result of the balance sheet audit. In most cases the exact timing of the audit or of the default event itself is not driven by economic factors but merely by procedural circumstances. Consequently, only the year of the default gives reasonable information for modelling. See Shumway (2001) and Hamerle et al (2004) for examples of using time-discrete hazard rates as default models.
We mainly use hazard models because they offer the possibility to estimate bank-specific and 4
It was not possible to empirically demonstrate throughout that discriminant analysis performs worse. The results of comparative studies are mixed: Lo (1986) finds no significant differences, whereas Espahbodi -5 -macroeconomic variables simultaneously. There is little evidence on the importance of macroeconomic information for forecasting banks' default, a remarkable exception being Nuxoll (2003) . In his paper, Nuxoll explicitly investigates the contribution of macroeconomic and regional economic data to bank-failure models and finds that these variables impair the forecasting power of the model. The findings are explained mainly by data limitations, unstable lag structures due to differences in behaviour among the regional supervisory authorities, and the fact that the economic development is reflected in the bank-specific variables. It should be noted that the data limitations are related to the fact that in the US most indicators, like regional GDP, are available only with a lag of several years. In his study, he therefore uses personal income. We argue that, first of all, it not surprising that regional personal income is reflected in the banks' balance sheets, and therefore does not contribute to the forecast. The reason is that it is a lagged indicator of economic activity. 5 Instead, we use indicators which are better suited. Second, Nuxoll investigates only the discriminative power of the models, ignoring the fit to historical default rates. However, a model with a good discriminative power may perform poorly when predicting the default rate because the discriminative power depends only on the relative risk of the banks and not on the level of the risk. For risk assessment, probabilities of default (PDs) are more adequate than relative risk measures. We therefore analyse the contribution of the macroeconomic information on both the discriminative power and the PD.
(1991) notes that the measures for the power of discriminant procedures are exaggerated. The findings of Lennox (1999) show that maximum likelihood methods have greater power.
5
As mentioned before, Nuxoll uses personal income mainly because of the late observability of US regional data, like GDP. In Germany many macroeconomic and regional data are available earlier than the balance sheet.
-6 -3 Probabilities of default, data and lag structure A PD for a given bank captures the probability that the bank will default within a certain period. If, as customary, the period covers the following year, the mean PD (aggregated across all banks) is an estimator for the default rate of that year. More important, it has to be clarified what exactly is meant by default. Most naturally, one would define default as insolvency. The problem arises from the fact that savings banks and cooperative banks simply do not become insolvent because the deposit guarantee scheme for these banking groups guarantees the going-concern basis, for example with the help of capital preservation measures or by a merger with a healthy institution of the same banking group and region.
Therefore we define default (i) as any intervention on part of the supervisory authority, the auditor or the deposit guarantee scheme (disclosure of facts pursuant to section 29 (3) of the Banking Act (BA), moratoriums pursuant to section 46a of the BA, capital preservation measures or also the application for such and restructuring caused by mergers) or (ii) as high losses (losses amounting to 25% of liable capital or a negative operating result in excess of 25% of liable capital). 6 In the Bundesbank's database the default information is available for the years between 1995 and 2002. During that time a triple-digit number of credit cooperatives and savings banks has undergone one of the default events. The exact total number of defaults is confidential Bundesbank information, yet it is higher than in most of the studies cited in section 2.
The dataset for the explanatory variables combines financial information about individual banks with macroeconomic data. Due to the regional restrictions of savings banks we also use regional macroeconomic data. We do not incorporate market information, since the banking groups we focus on are not publicly traded and other market information is hardly available.
The macroeconomic time series are gathered by the Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt) and the Bundesbank. As mentioned earlier, the financial data is taken from an unpublished Deutsche Bundesbank database which covers balance sheets, profit loss accounts, key figures from the audit report, information about the credit portfolio (credit 6 The default definition is developed from a supervisory perspective. The prudential supervisory purpose is to prevent insolvencies, so the definition covers all events indicating that the bank is in danger of ceasing to exist as a going concern without outside intervention.
-7 -register) etc. Most of the data is observed annually and is available for each year from 1993 on. It should be noted that the Bundesbank collects individual bank data for statistical and supervisory purposes. Therefore, the dataset covers not only all banks but also all financial ratios which are generally used for the risk assessment of a bank. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to analyse the risk of German savings and cooperative banks with a dataset of similar quality.
7
In order to add the default information to our dataset we create a dummy variable Y t that takes the value 1 if a default is observed in the year t + 2 and zero otherwise. Banks that are still in existence after default are eliminated from the sample. The rationale for the two-year lag is that most of the default events are the result of the balance sheet audit. Consequently a default occurring in the year t + 2 has been caused by the financial situation in the year t + 1. One further lag is introduced owing to the forecast horizon of one year. * ∆ Default rate is the difference between default rate in the current year and the previous year. Table 1 reports the distribution of the total number of savings banks and cooperative banks.
There is an ongoing process of consolidation within both banking groups and the total number of institutions is continuously diminishing. Virtually all exits from the markets are mergers with another bank of the same banking group. Since the number of defaults is confidential, we report the first differences of the default rate series. These figures reveal important fluctuations in risk over time. Most notably, the increased difficulties of the banking sector in recent years are reflected in a peak of the default rate in 2001.
A detailed overview of the data is given by the respective reporting forms which the banks have to provide and which are published by the Bundesbank (www.bundesbank.de). The total number of savings banks' defaults is too small to develop two separate models for both banking groups. Since savings banks and cooperative banks have identical business structures, we specify and estimate an overall model and afterwards review the validity of the overall model for the subpopulations.
institutions which, according to our default definition, have defaulted. A few institutions could not be included in the analysis since they failed to submit returns.
-9 -Our main rationale for using a hazard model is that it allows to combine microeconomic and macroeconomic information. Since bank defaults are observed annually, we use discrete-time hazard models to estimate PD.
Discrete-time hazard models estimate the hazard rate λ it which gives the PD at time t under the condition that no default has occurred prior to t:
where T i is a random variable that stands for the year when the default of bank i occurs, X it is an (nx1) vector of exogenous factors (covariates) and β a (1xn) vector of coefficients. Since for bank insolvencies the realisations of T i are observed annually, λ it corresponds to the oneyear PD.
Hazard models allow a parametric estimation of the effect of time on default. This is often done when, starting from a specified event, the development of the default probability over time is analysed. An example is the question of how the risk of a newly founded company evolves in the first years of its business. Our analysis instead aims at predicting the default rate of a bank in a specific year when the bank has existed for a couple of decades. We therefore introduce time into the model via a baseline hazard rate λ 0t and estimate it nonparametrically. λ 0t comprises all factors which are not measured by the covariates and which affect the PD of a certain period for all banks with an equal impact. This means that λ 0t
can be treated like a time effect. We further assume that the covariates only incompletely explain the differences between banks, so that the observations belonging to the same bank will be correlated. The correlation is modelled with the individual effect λ i0 . With these assumptions the hazard model can be written as
with S it = 0 , 1
S it is often referred to as the score. The score constitutes an order of the banks according to their riskiness. The link function Φ transforms the score into the PD. Equation (2) illustrates that the discrete-time hazard model is an extension of a binary response model for panel data.
The choice of the link function is usually arbitrary, since there are no economic indications on -10 -which function to use. In many empirical studies, however, the outcome does not seem to depend much on the specific link function. In the following we will alternatively estimate our model with the logit,
the probit 2 2 1 ( ) 2π
and the complementary log-logistic (cloglog) link function
(3), (4) and (5) are the most widely used link functions for empirical analysis, (3) because of its computational simplicity, (4) because of the popularity of the normal distribution, and (5) because it is the discrete-time version of the proportional Cox-model (see Kalbfleisch, Prentice (1980) ). Both (3) and (4) are symmetric and give similar values, though the tails of the logistic distribution are heavier than that of the normal distribution. (5) is asymmetric.
For the time effect λ 0t year-dummies can be included in the estimation, thus λ 0t is treated as a fixed-effect. 9 Forecasting with a model that contains year-dummies results in a two-step procedure where, in a first step, forecast values for the dummy have to be fixed. Instead, we prefer a one-step estimation in which we minimise the time effect by choosing appropriate variables. Thus, minimising the time effect is part of our specification strategy. The year dummies will be introduced afterwards as a part of the model validation, ie in order to test the null hypothesis that λ 0t = 0.
There are no fixed-effects models for the individual effect λ i0 , the only exception being the approach proposed by Chamberlain (1980) for the logit link function. His method, however, requires that the individuals manifest a change of the status in the endogenous variable and 9
We do not consider random-effects models for λ 0t because they require the assumption that different λ 0t are not temporally correlated. Since λ 0t is mainly driven by the macroeconomic development, we consider this assumption unrealistic.
-11 -skips all other individuals from the sample. Such a procedure is not feasible for default data as it would restrict the sample to the defaulted banks. We therefore model λ i0 as a random effect.
For discrete-time hazard models there are two kinds of models. 10 One type is cluster-specific models, which calculate coefficients that have to be interpreted in a manner specific to the institution. A cluster-specific coefficient β i represents the average of the individual institution's reaction (measured in logit changes) to a change in a covariate. By contrast, population-averaged models measure the logit change of an average institution in reaction to a change in the covariate X i . Both averages are different because (3), (4) and (5) are nonlinear models. Besides, both methods produce slightly different estimates for the endogenous variable. The cluster-specific model estimates PDs which are conditioned on the individual effect. As a consequence, the output for a specific bank is an interval estimation of the PD. In the population-specific model case, the output PD can be interpreted as an average value for all individuals with the same covariate structure.
Generally, for forecasting purposes both models are meaningful, so we estimate them both.
Since we find only negligible differences in the estimated coefficients, in the following we only present the results of the population-averaged model. The population-averaged model can be estimated by GEE following Zeger and Liang (1986) . Estimations are carried out with the software package Stata, release 8. 10 An overview of the models and their estimators can be found in Pendergast et al (1996) or Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) .
-12 -Economic theory gives only rough ideas for the specification of a rating tool. The main reason is that the relevant theoretical models build on data which are not observable. For example, the most prominent models, which are market-value models (also known as asset value models: see eg Falkenstein et al (2000) for an overview) estimate PDs with the help of market data which are not available for cooperative banks and savings banks. The common feature of most default models is that the default event sets in when the capitalisation (the difference between assets and outside funds) falls below a given threshold, such as zero. We therefore define our task as using balance sheet and macroeconomic information to predict future capitalisation. Our model thus includes variables which measure (1) current capitalisation and variables which forecast returns. As predictors for returns we use (2) current returns and factors that influence future returns. For the latter we include factors that are related to the core activities of savings banks and cooperative banks, namely deposit business, lending business and market transactions. These are variables which capture (3) the credit quality, (4) the market risk, (5) the business cycle, and (6) some macroeconomic prices. An alternative categorisation of risk relevant factors for banks is given by the structure of the CAMELS rating. CAMELS is the bank rating system used by the US federal depository regulators (the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, the OCC, the OTS, and the NCUA, see Lopez -13 -(1999) for an overview) mainly for on-site examination and is often taken as a benchmark for other models. The method comprehends separate ratings for capital adequacy, asset quality, management quality, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk. The present model will not be developed with the CAMELS categories, mainly because management quality and liquidity cannot be measured adequately with our data. The management quality of a bank could be assessed with qualitative information (mainly deriving from on-site inspections)
which is not available. For liquidity the annual structure of our dataset is inadequate and, in addition, the Principle II liquidity reports are not available for the entire period covered by the study. With our dataset, though, it is possible to generate some proxies for liquidity and management quality (such as the cost income ratio for management quality). We assign these proxies to the other categories.
Following the practice of rating agencies (see eg Falkenstein et. al . (2000)) we separately analyse the variables before creating the model. There are mainly two reasons for this preliminary univariate procedure. First, as table 2 shows, there are often alternative ways to measure the same risk factor. For example, profitability can be measured by net income or EBIT and, without looking at the data, it is controversial which ratio performs best. The second and more important reason is to find out which variables have to be transformed prior to modelling. Variable transformation improves the forecasting performance when the relationship between the variable and the PD is not monotone. As can be seen from equation
(2) the PD in the hazard model is a monotone function of the covariates. For many variables monotony is a reasonable assumption and there is no need for a transformation -for example one would expect that a rising equity ratio will, cp, lead to a lower PD. There are, however, some exceptions, the most important case being variables which are affected by volatility.
Generally, high volatilities indicate increased riskiness. Due to a lack of long time series, rating systems often incorporate annual changes of ratios instead of volatility, with the consequence that the resulting risk patterns are non-monotone. The growth of the equity ratio, for example, typically manifests a (negative) monotone relationship to PD for low and moderate values. Due to volatility, however, very high values may be associated with growing
PDs. In this case the predictive power of the variable in the hazard model can be enhanced when the variable is transformed, so that the resulting variable is a monotone function of PD.
We measure the predictive power of a variable and analyse the monotony assumption with the -14 -help of two statistical tools: the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUR) and the information value (IV) 11 . AUR can be calculated by first ordering the data according to the variable of interest and then calculating the percentages of defaults and non-defaults above a certain threshold value of the variable. The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve plots the percentages of the defaults against the percentages of the non-defaults for all possible threshold values. As an example, figure 1 shows the ROC curve for the ratio of operating results to equity. The distance of the curve from the diagonal is a graphical measure of the discriminative power of the variable. AUR is given by the area under the ROC curve.
As the coordinates are normalised to unity, the values of AUR range between 1 (maximal positive discriminative power) and 0 (maximal negative discriminative power). If AUR equals 0.5 the variable has no discriminative power.
The AUR presumes that the monotony assumption is valid. Figure 2 gives an example for the ROC curve when this assumption is violated. The ROC for the annual percentage change in credits to customers is first convex, then concave and finally convex, meaning that a strong reduction and a strong growth of credits are related to high risks, whereas moderate changes are associated with low risks. From this example it becomes evident that the AUR does not report the discriminative power of the variable.
11 The predictive power of a variable can be measured with a variety of other methods such as the accuracy ratio or the Mann-Whitney U-test (1947), most of which are equivalent to AUR (see Engelmann et al (2003) ), but not to IV.
-15 - and K the total number of classes. IV measures, in terms of log-odds, how the a priori forecast (default rate of the portfolio) can be improved with the help of the variable. The drawbacks of IV are that they require a classification of the data before the calculation 12 and that there is no statistical test related to it. IV ranges from zero to infinity. Higher values are associated with a higher discriminative power of the variable.
For each variable, we calculate IV and AUR and draw the ROC curve. We compare the discriminative power of two variables by testing if the respective AUR are equal. 13 In order to check the monotony assumption we inspect the ROC curves and compare the IV and AUR. If high IV is associated with low AUR and the ROC is not convex (or concave), an adequate transformation may have a great impact on the performance. We then transform the variables with two alternative methods.
The first transformation entails a classification of the variable. The values of the variables are then replaced by the likelihood ratio of the specific class, where the likelihood ratio is lr i = p Ai /p Ni . This is equivalent to including dummy variables for the classes in the model. The major drawback of this approach is that due to the classification, the information within a class is ignored. Furthermore, there is no theoretically convincing method for choosing the classes.
We therefore also apply an extension of the dummy variable approach that avoids classification and which calculates the likelihood ratio continuously, ie p Ai and p Ni are replaced with the values of the respective density functions. 14 The density functions can be estimated from the sample with kernel estimation. The transformation is optimal in the sense that it maximises the AUR; however, the implementation is computationally much more complex than the dummy variable approach. As an example, the appendix reproduces the ROC curves of the annual percentage change in credits to customers for the dummy approach 12 The continuous version of IV requires kernel estimation of the conditional density functions and is computationally extensive. The relationship between IV and AUR is given in Tasche (2002) . 13 The test procedure can be found in DeLong, DeLong and Clarke-Pearson (1988) . 14 The density functions can be estimated by kernel estimators. For our calculations we use the Gaussian kernel in which the width of the density window is determined by the rule of Silverman (1986) .
-17 - -18 -
Results
The coefficients of the population average model are contained in table 3 for alternative link functions. All coefficients have the expected sign and are significantly different from zero. For reasons of comparability the coefficients of the probit (complementary log-logistic) model are multiplied by π/3 1/2 (2 1/2 ). R² refers to a regression of the annual average PDs on the historical default rates. * Undisclosed reserves pursuant to sections 340f and 340g of the German Commercial Code (HGB). ** Undisclosed losses due to a transfer of securities, stocks or bonds to fixed assets *** Loans with increased risks and provisioned loans
The current capitalisation is measured with three ratios which comprise tier 1 capital, undisclosed reserves and undisclosed losses due to a transfer of securities, stocks or bonds to fixed assets. The current returns are modelled with operating results, and credit risk with customer loans (level and growth) and loans with increased risks. The growth of customer loans enters the model after it has been transformed with the continuous approach described 15 With the help of the method proposed by Pregibon (1981) outliers were identified and eliminated from the analysis prior to estimation. In our data set, this study ended up excluding three (solvent) banks.
-19 -in the previous section. 16 Market risk is measured by the difference between fixed-rate liabilities and fixed-rate assets. Finally, as macroeconomic factors the model includes the growth of the capital market interest rate and regional insolvencies.
The AUR of roughly 81% reveals a high discriminative power of all three models. As measured by R² the cloglog model seems to explain the annual default rates better than the other models. This result, however, should not be taken too seriously, since the calculation of R² is based on 7 observations only. To find out whether the three models perform differently in terms of fit, we compare the empirical default distributions with the theoretical density We assume that the different performance in both subperiods is due to a structural change in the default time series which probably reflects the severe problems of the German banking system in the last few years (and the efforts to overcome them). This explanation is confirmed by the finding that in the model building process we were able to estimate models with different variables and a similar overall performance. These models all revealed a good fit to the first subperiod, but they were not able to explain the peak in the year 2001. We finally opted for the model in table 3 because we attributed higher importance to the more recent development. 16 Note that including the transformed variable considerably complicates a possible implementation of the model. Therefore, for practical purposes, it may be convenient to skip or to replace this variable. In this regard it should be underlined that the model presented in table 3 was designed for academic purposes only. 17 The conclusions that we reach from the following discussion are unaffected by the choice of the link function.
-20 - In order to analyse the relationship between macroeconomic and bank-specific factors, we split our model into two separate models: a model which contains only macroeconomic variables and another model which contains only individual variables. Table 5 shows the AUR and the R² from a regression of the average default probability on the historical default rate for the separate models. The discriminative power (AUR) can be attributed almost entirely to the individual bank data. In line with Nuxoll (2003) we find a poor discriminative power of the macroeconomic variables. This is not surprising since they have a smaller variation: their values are equal for each bank of the same year and region. More interestingly, the fit to the average default rate can be attributed almost entirely to the macroeconomic factors.
Obviously, bank-specific data mainly determine the relative risk, ie the order of banks by riskiness, whereas macroeconomic information mainly determines the level of risk.
Eventually, risk models which rely on financial ratios alone are not able to predict the level of the PD. So, unlike Nuxoll (2003), we conclude that the macroeconomic variables play an important role in predicting defaults.
-22 - It should be emphasised that the findings do not give evidence of the causal importance of the risk factors, since they are based on a forecasting model and not on a structural model. A forecasting model shows the informative importance of the variables at a given point of time.
In our context this means that we can interpret the results in the following way: Without macroeconomic information, only the position of the bank within the whole banking sector (relative risk) can be determined. For estimating the bank's PD, macroeconomic information is necessary. The importance of the macroeconomic information probably depends on the fact that it is more forward-looking than the balance sheet information.
Next, we analyse the informative importance of the individual bank factors. This is done in terms of AUR, as the bank-specific variables mainly determine the discriminative power of the model. We calculate the marginal contribution of a single variable to the discriminative power of the model by comparing the overall AUR with the AUR that results from a model that excludes the variable. Table 6 reports the relative marginal contributions of all bankspecific variables. As expected the variables which are directly linked to the capitalisation (equity, undisclosed reserves and undisclosed losses taken together) have the greatest informative importance. Among these factors, the undisclosed reserves have by far the most predictive power. Obviously, banks which are in severe trouble will start to reduce their undisclosed reserves. Market risk alone has a similar discriminative power as the other risk factors taken together (credit risk and operating results).
-23 - Operating results to Tier 1 capital 9.09%
Customer loans to balance sheet total 3.52%
Customer loans in t to customer loans in t-1 (transf.) 2.64%
Loans with increased risks*** to audited loans 11.58%
[Fixed-rate liabilities -fixed-rate assets] to balance 28.01% sheet total * Undisclosed reserves pursuant to sections 340f and 340g of the German Commercial Code (HGB) ** Undisclosed losses due to a transfer of securities, stocks or bonds to fixed assets *** Loans with increased latent risks and provisioned loans -24 -Statistical tests for the validation of the model which build on a hold-out sample for 2002
were already performed during the specification. Most notably, the sharp decline of the default rate in the year 2002 was predicted by the model. This section discusses the stability of the model from a qualitative perspective.
The stability of the discriminative power can be analysed by examining annual AUR values of the model and the single variables. Table 7 reports the respective values. There is some variation of the performance in the individual years, mainly due to undisclosed losses and the variables which measure credit risk. However, for the whole model the differences are not significant. -26 -German savings banks and cooperative banks constitute an integral part of the German banking system. There is, however, little evidence concerning their default risk. We try to fill this gap in the literature and propose a statistical model which estimates the PDs of both banking groups. Since we adopt a prudential supervisory perspective, default is defined as any event that jeopardises the viability of the bank as a going concern. Our dataset combines default events with balance sheet information, audit reports, and macroeconomic variables.
We estimate a discrete-time hazard model.
We find that the relevant factors for the estimation of a bank's PD comprise the general macroeconomic environment and the bank's return, credit risk, market risk and, most importantly for the discrimination, the capitalisation. We further find that using the same model for savings banks and cooperative banks is adequate, although savings banks are more risk sensitive. However, the stability of the results may be impaired by a structural change in the time series of the default rates.
Contrary to former research (see Nuxoll (2003) ) we conclude that macroeconomic information is an integral element in forecasting banks' default. There are two main explanations for the differences to the cited study. First, the German regional macroeconomic information is available comparatively early, so that at a given point of time the correlation with the balance sheet information is low. Second, in his analysis Nuxoll has focussed on the discriminative power of the model. However, the discriminative power measures only one aspect of a bank's PD, namely the relative risk, while ignoring the risk level. In our analysis we focus on both the discriminative power and the risk level. Our results show that rating tools which rely solely on financial ratios may not be suited to capture the risk level of a bank.
At the same time, adding macroeconomic information to the model greatly improves the forecasting performance.
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